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This paper assesses the contribution of the European Central Bank (ECB) to Germany’s ongoing 
economic crisis, a vicious circle of decline in which the country has become stuck since the 
early 1990s. It is argued that the ECB continues the Bundesbank tradition of asymmetric 
policymaking: the bank is quick to hike, but slow to ease. It thereby acts as a brake on growth. 
This approach has worked for the Bundesbank in the past because other banks behaved 
differently. Exporting the Bundesbank “success story” to Euroland has undermined its working, 
however; given its sheer size, Euroland simply cannot freeload on external stimuli forever. 
While Euroland cannot do without proper demand management, the Maastricht regime and 
especially the ECB are firmly geared against it. The ECB’s monetary policies have been biased 
against growth and have thus proved bad for Euroland as a whole. Meanwhile, the German 
disease of protracted domestic demand weakness has spread across much of Euroland. Yet, by 
pursuing its peculiar traditions of wage restraint and procyclical public thrift, the ECB’s policies 
have had even worse results for Germany. Fragility and divergence undermine the euro’s long-
term survival.  
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OF THE GRAND IDEA OF A GERMAN-STYLE EMU, BUNDESBANK TRADITIONS, 
AND WHAT MAASTRICHT REALLY MEANT 
 
The idea of establishing an economic and monetary union in Europe goes back a long way to 
almost the beginning of the post-WWII era, reaching a first peak with the famous “Werner 
Plan” of 1970. It may be fair to say though that Germany was never at the forefront of this 
movement towards a single European currency. In the age-old dispute between the so-called 
“economists” and “monetarists,” both Germany’s economics profession as well as political 
authorities championed the “coronation theory,” according to which a common currency had to 
be the gracious final step in a drawn-out process that could only be risked if economic and 
political integration had been firmly achieved beforehand. Germany’s acclaimed guardian of 
monetary stability, the Deutsche Bundesbank, represented a stronghold of this view. And 
suspicions of the bank’s fierce opposition to EMU were never far from the surface, abroad and 
at home. For good reason, some would say, this influential institution was never too keen to lose 
its powerful grip on monetary affairs in Germany, and Europe too.   
  While the complacent view that what was good for Germany had to be good for the rest 
of Europe too, may have been popular in Germany, much of the rest of Europe found 
Germany’s monetary hegemony increasingly intolerable; and quite understandably so. In the 
second half of the 1980s, in the context of the “Single Market Programme” and as the Basle-
Nyborg agreement confirmed the deutschmark’s status as the anchor currency within the “hard 
EMS,” the idea of replacing the unloved (outside of Germany) hegemon attained new strength. 
Europe was lucky that not all German leaders were unsympathetic to the idea, as the Genscher 
memorandum of 1988 showed. Helmut Kohl’s part in getting the Bundesbank aboard and the 
euro afloat cannot be overrated.  
  In any case, it was probably always clear to the German mind that if Germany were ever 
to give up its beloved deutschmark at all, the successor would have to be at least as hard and 
strong and sound as the deutschmark itself ever was. From a German perspective, the prospect 
of a successful EMU always featured exporting the Bundesbank cum deutschmark “success 
story” to Europe as a sine qua non. The Delors Commission—with Bundesbank president Karl-
Otto Poehl in charge—set the scene. And while a number of details may have been 
compromised on at the Maastricht negotiations of 1990-91, reflecting the fact that views and 
predispositions in the rest of Europe were in many cases fundamentally different ones, 
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 essentially, Germany got its way in the end. In a nutshell, if German monetary hegemony was to 
be overcome, Europe simply had to swallow Germany’s conditions (or, the Bundesbank’s; for 
its own abdication, that is).  
Not only was the ECB modelled on the Bundesbank—Germany’s acclaimed guardian of 
monetary stability provided the blueprint for the structure of monetary policy in EMU. The 
ECB’s independence even surpasses the Bundesbank’s, secured at the constitutional level rather 
than just by a simple law. In addition, under the Bundesbank’s former chief economist Otmar 
Issing, the pursuance of a “stability-oriented” course was guaranteed, too; as was the adoption 
of other Bundesbank traditions. The ECB’s overall autocratic style and peculiar public relations 
is a case in point, featuring a passion for continuous public criticisms of issues relating to any 
other policy area—paired with the standard dismissal of any criticism of its own policies and 
practices as an attack on its all-important independence.
1 To make the case really watertight, the 
ECB was to be further protected from fiscal policy by a “Stability Pact” that would keep finance 
ministers’ fingers firmly away from the printing press. Clearly, the presumption in all this was 
that by exporting Germany’s success model, this would work even better, both for Europe as 
well as for Germany itself.  
Alas, this is not the way things have played out since 1999—which raises the question 
why not. One answer stresses the role of allegedly all-pervasive “structural problems” in 
Germany and across Euroland as the sole cause of all troubles. This “explanation” is especially 
popular in Germany itself, where a tradition of “supply-side-only” economics holds sway (for a 
critique see Hein and Truger 2005). While the emphasis of structural problems is popular among 
Anglo-Saxon mainstream economists, too, the attitude is usually a more balanced one, with 
structural reform and demand management seen as complements (Posen 2003).  
My own position is that while I would not deny the desirability of certain reforms, 
carrying through with structural reform without proper demand management may be worse than 
useless. The fact is that, except for the four-year interruption around unification, Germany has 
operated way below potential ever since the early 1980s. And, for reasons to be investigated in 
what follows, the situation for much of the rest of Euroland is becoming more and more similar 
                                                 
1 See Henning 1994, Kenen 1995, and Dyson and Featherstone 1999 on the route to Maastricht. See Bibow 2004b 
on Bundesbank history and the intellectual origins for the Maastricht regime. In this context, it is quite 
extraordinary that Otmar Issing should try to paint this regime as having anything to do with the views of Walter 
Eucken on sound “Ordnungspolitik” (see Issing 2004). Discretionary interest rate policies by uncontrolled central 
bank politicians are totally alien to Eucken’s (1952) scheme. One might then just as well assert that Keynes’s key 
insight was that fiscal policy is always and everywhere ineffective.   
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 to the German malaise. Arguably, under such conditions structural reforms may actually do 
more harm than any good. Certainly I consider assertions to the effect that structural reforms 
and/or fiscal consolidation by themselves—through alleged “confidence effects” or so—would 
always and everywhere automatically look after sufficient domestic demand as no better than 
plain nonsense. (And unfortunately it is this kind of “wisdom” that has dominated economic 
policymaking in Germany for more than two decades now; cf. Roloff 2002). Thus, the emphasis 
in what follows will be on the peculiar macroeconomic policies that Germany and Euroland 
have had to put up with, especially the policies of the ECB.  
In this regard, the key to “stability-orientation” à la Bundesbank is the asymmetry in 
approach and mindset. Metaphorically speaking, the ECB acts like a driver who is quick at 
slamming the brakes, but notoriously abstains from using the accelerator. While, quite 
obviously, this is not a recipe for smooth driving, it does beg the question why it seems to have 
worked for the Bundesbank, and quite well for so long.  
  Essentially, it worked for the Bundesbank because, and as long as, everyone else 
behaved differently. In particular, the Bundesbank’s peculiar driving style worked fine when 
nominal exchange rates were stable, Germany’s trading partners’ inflation generally higher than 
its own, and as the accelerator was applied skilfully “elsewhere in the world economy” (to 
borrow one of those phrases the ECB coined to pass on the buck). Things worked best under 
Bretton Woods. The situation was then almost replicated under the “hard EMS” of the 1980s; 
with the rest of Europe bearing the economic and fiscal brunt of Buba wisdom. In Germany’s 
case, misconceptions about an—apparently—successful consolidation strategy of the 1980s that 
was to be replicated at the European level were important too.  
In fact, and as an early warning of things to come, the Maastricht convergence process of 
disinflation cum coordinated fiscal consolidation saw Europe moving towards the brink of 
stagnation by the mid 1990s. Luckily the U.S.’s “new-era” growth and soaring dollar provided a 
last-minute external lifeline that allowed EMU to go ahead. Not quite so luckily, today’s 
international imbalances are also partly rooted in these events.  
  For the Maastricht Treaty meant the creation of an economic area comparable in size to 
the U.S. economy, but without a proper demand management regime in place and with certain 
key policymakers’ mindset firmly predisposed against the use of stabilization policies. 
Ironically, exporting the Buba “success story” was doomed to failure because it had only 
worked in the past—and for Germany alone!—exactly for the fact that everyone else behaved 
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 differently. Hence a regime change requiring everyone else too to behave just like Germany was 
surely asking for trouble. But Germany got itself into deep trouble even before EMU started—
namely by severe macroeconomic policy blunders in response to unification. A closer look at 
those blunders offers some interesting lessons concerning events that have since been unfolding 
across Euroland.   
 
OF GERMANY’S PRE-EMU HISTORY AND THE UNIFICATION CHALLENGE: 
MIRACLES AND BLUNDERS, AND A LASTING BURDEN 
 
It cannot be denied that unification presented Germany with a huge economic challenge. With 
East Germany’s capital stock in a pitiable shape, massive public and private investment for 
years and decades to come was the only way toward narrowing the gap in comparison to 
advanced economies. Luckily, West Germany was in a favorable economic position as the 
happy event drew near. After having grown rather sluggishly since the 1981-82 recession as a 
result of fiscal austerity and Bundesbank restraint, which led to weak demand, slack investment, 
and underutilized capacity, growth of the former West German economy picked up markedly 
toward the end of the decade.  
It so happened that, in 1989, when the Berlin wall came down, there was noninflationary 
and broad-based GDP growth due to strong domestic and foreign demand that yielded high 
employment growth and a balanced budget, together with a trade surplus of 5 percent of GDP. 
While exports, traditionally relied upon for igniting demand-led growth, performed strongly 
(and the oil price slump of 1986 rendered a terms-of-trade boon), fiscal and monetary policies 
too contributed (although belatedly) to the recovery in domestic demand as a result of income 
tax cuts in 1986 and 1988 (and also in 1990), along with an accommodative monetary stance (in 
the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash) that lasted until mid-1989.  
In the years 1990-91, the former West Germany’s economy coped impressively 
smoothly with the strains that unification put on its resources (see Bibow 2003). Real GDP grew 
at a solid rate of five percent in both years, and while producer price inflation remained stable at 
around 2 percent, and underlying CPI inflation was stable at around 2.5 percent; perfectly in line 
with the inflation trend during the 1980s. Investment, potential output, and labor productivity 
grew rapidly, with the result that supply-side growth was both strong and broad-based. 
Employment growth was evenly distributed and included people previously classified as 
structurally unemployed. Moreover, the influx of labor from the former East Germany provided 
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 important supply-side relief, so that general labor market pressures were abated. In addition, 
Germany drew on increasingly underutilized foreign resources; as reflected by the swift swing 
in the current account (from a 5 percent of GDP surplus in 1989 to a small deficit in the early 
1990s).  
For one thing, Germany’s current account swing confirmed that unification also 
represented a great chance for Europe to stay clear from the slump that was hitting, for instance, 
the U.S., the U.K., and Japan at the time. For another, Germany’s stellar performance over the 
four-year period of 1988-1991, during which the alleged structural paralytic grew at a 4-5 
percent annual pace without any significant rise in market-determined inflation, produced the 
very evidence to put the structural (“eurosclerosis”) myth to rest (that was much en vogue 
during the 1980s too). Miraculously, it would have seemed for lack of any profound structural 
reforms, Germany enjoyed an employment boom just at a time when—for once—domestic 
demand grew strongly too.  
This lucky situation, which had come about by historical accident, was not to last 
however. Clearly the order of the day was to sustain growth and investment. But the 
Bundesbank was determined to slam the brakes, and slam them hard too. With Helmut 
Schlesinger at the helm, the Bundesbank pushed real interest rates up to 5-6 in 1991, a level that 
was bound to crash Western Germany’s economy. Subsequently, with Hans Tietmeyer at the 
helm, the Bundesbank even surpassed its own historical record when it eased interest rates in an 
extraordinarily slow fashion. From early on, though, the Bundesbank mounted its pressure on 
the government to cut the budget deficit (Akerlof et al. 1991, Smith Owen 1994, von Hagen 
1994).  
It is true that from 1989 to 1991 the German government deliberately relied upon 
borrowing to take up almost the whole of unification’s fiscal brunt. By 1991, an overall budget 
deficit of €44 billion (a deficit ratio of 2.9 percent) had replaced a budget that was balanced in 
1989. Starting in 1992, the government began to introduce a series of new fiscal measures aimed 
at cutting its borrowing requirements. Between 1992 and 1995 a cumulative fiscal tightening 
occurred that was far in excess of initial borrowing requirements. According to Heilemann and 
Rappen (1997), by 1995, the total effect of expenditure savings and increases in taxes and social 
security contributions was sufficient to finance almost the whole of gross fiscal transfers 
amounting to €92 billion. Paradoxically, as it might have seemed, Germany’s deficit ratio did 
not decline, but rose instead, reaching 3.4 percent in 1996.  
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 As we know today, Germany has yet to emerge from the debt trap it seems to have fallen 
into in the aftermath of its unification. After a last-minute dash below the Maastricht three 
percent hurdle in 1997 due to a U.S. sponsored export boom followed by a brief spurt of growth 
in 1999-2000, Germany has breeched the three-percent limit of the Stability and Growth Pact in 
every year since 2002—and is currently expected to continue doing so until 2007. Accordingly, 
for years to come, Germany is expected to cut its structural budget deficit by at least 0.5 percent 
of GDP per year no matter what. This follows from the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact as 
currently interpreted, and it abides by the fiscal wisdom that has guided fiscal policy in 
Germany and much of Euroland since the early 1990s. This wisdom asserts that one should 
never worry too much about possible negative demand effects of fiscal consolidation (so-called 
Keynesian effects). But trust that fiscal consolidation will stimulate domestic demand instead 
(so-called non-Keynesian effects).  
  From the beginning the “German view” (cf. Hellwig and Neumann 1987, Fels and 
Flöhlich 1987, Bibow 2004d) has been a rather dubious story at best. Of course “non-Keynesian 
effects” may arise in situations of financial crisis to the extent that the announcement of fiscal 
austerity leads to sufficiently sharp falls in interest rates. And, of course, dwarf economies like 
Ireland’s, for instance, may be lucky enough to get away with a pro-cyclical fiscal squeeze 
while relying on net exports to keep the economy afloat. By contrast, in cases like Germany’s, 
sufficient interest rate falls can only be delivered by monetary policy to begin with, while 
freeloading on net exports is hazardous as it assumes that trade partners may be complacent 
enough in allowing their trade positions to deteriorate correspondingly. Clearly, then, in 
Euroland’s case even more so than in Germany’s, the latter is not a viable option at all, so that 
the whole burden to compensate public thrift campaigns clearly shifts to monetary policy alone.    
  In view of popular myths about the “burden of unification” that allegedly still plagues 
Germany today it is important to get the record straight here. It is undeniable that unification 
destabilized former East Germany’s economy; even though the event may just have been the 
trigger of ultimate wreckage of what was wrecked anyway. In any case, large-scale public 
transfers were an inevitable consequence of this—the price to be paid for this historical 
responsibility. Transfers were needed both to cope with the resulting unemployment as well as 
for building up a first-world capital stock. The fact is that Western Germany’s economy coped 
smoothly with this challenge initially: through strong, non-inflationary growth. Another fact is 
that Germany could easily rely on foreign support too, since it started out from an intolerably 
6
 large current account surplus and foreign resources were abundantly underutilized anyway. 
Finally, another key fact is that Germany’s public finances remained on a sustainable course 
initially. There was thus no reason to panic. To sustain investment and growth was the order of 
the day.  
Figure 1. No end to austerity, no end to crisis
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Notes: financial balance for 2000 exc. one-off UMTS revenues. Deficit ratios not exceeding "maximum 























































In this context, it should always be remembered that even a permanent deficit of 3 
percent of GDP can be sustainable at a non-rising 60 percent debt ratio, namely as long as 
nominal GDP grows at five percent (Domar 1944, Pasinetti 1998, Bibow 2003, 2004a). In actual 
fact, Germany was lucky enough in having a significant margin left after the fiscal brunt of 
unification had hit the budget. Figure 1 summarizes how Germany subsequently maneuvered 
itself into a debt trap, namely by crushing GDP growth. To test whether or not the particular 
parameter constellation prevalent in any year would have implied a rising debt ratio, the 
“stability financial balance” is defined here as the deficit ratio that is indefinitely sustainable 
given the actual rate of nominal GDP growth and actual debt ratio for a particular period. As 
long as the actual financial balance does not exceed the stability financial balance this implies 
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 sustainable debt dynamics in the form of a nonrising debt ratio. Correspondingly, the concept of 
the “sustainability gap” may be defined as the difference between actual and stability balances.  
The point is that Germany’s fiscal troubles were not a direct consequence of unification 
(i.e. transfers to the East), but of plunging GDP growth in the West. Since 1993 a rising 
sustainability gap has opened up as Germany’s consolidation efforts no matter what did not 
reduce the deficit ratio, but slashed the GDP growth rate instead. 
Importantly, starting out from a balanced budget and a debt ratio of 40 percent in 1989, 
there was no need for GDP growth to continue at five and nine percent in real and nominal 
terms, respectively. My argument does not presume the perpetuation of the four-year miracle 
that had debunked the structural myth of the 1980s. Rather, the sad fact is that over the course of 
the 1990s, GDP growth was actually crushed to zero and below two percent in real and nominal 
terms, respectively. This came about not due to sudden structural problems or external shocks, 
but as a consequence of remarkably inept macroeconomic policymaking. While the Bundesbank 
inflicted a long span of ultra-tight money that lasted from the early until the mid1990s, Theo 
Waigel turned the fiscal rudder hard right in 1992, embarking on that fateful path of senseless 
public thrift campaigns from which Germany has never strayed since. Together, these 
macroeconomic policies massively and persistently destabilized Western Germany’s economy.  
Puzzlingly, as it may have seemed, even as domestic demand was crushed and 
stagnation set in, inflation proved rather persistent: staying “above 2 percent” until 1995. This 
was due to a phenomenon that I dubbed “tax-push inflation” (Bibow 1998) and of which more 
will be heard momentarily. At this stage, the important point is that while wreckage in the East 
and a corresponding “burden of unification” was quite inevitable, this second burden in the 
West was not. As a consequence, however, EMU started with united Germany being in 
particularly poor shape.  
 
OF BUNDESBANK LEGACIES AND ECB BLUNDERS WITH NO END  
 
No doubt the Bundesbank’s legacies confronted the ECB with a formidable challenge.  After the 
monetary overkill in response to German unification, followed by very sluggish interest rate 
cuts, which had left Germany in the doldrums by the mid-nineties, the Bundesbank proved all 
too keen to hike interest rates in October 1997. By that time Germany was barely emerging from 
stagnation—thanks to U.S.-sponsored export growth. When only a little later Germany was then 
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 hit by the Asian and Russian crises, the Bundesbank exemplified the peculiar tradition referred 
to above: it simply refused to cut interest rates; much in contrast to central banks like the U.S. 
Fed and the Bank of England. And on top of its failure to ease, the Bundesbank’s 
communications even invited DM appreciation—in time for the euro to start from what was 
soon seen as too high a level, and with Euroland’s supposed economic powerhouse dubbed the 
“sick man of the euro.”  
Fragility at the core was not the only challenge though. Another was divergence. The 
interest rate convergence process granted Euroland’s periphery a nice boon to public finances, 
as the interest burden shrank. In addition, sharply falling interest rates in traditional high-
interest-rate countries boosted asset prices and domestic demand. Some parts of Euroland thus 
experienced robust domestic demand growth in the late 1990s, while Germany became ever 
more reliant on net exports (Bibow 2001b). Both fragility and divergence have since become 
worse, as will be discussed further below. Before, however, we need to address the ECB’s role 
in bringing about the current EMU crisis.
2  
Indeed, the bank’s performance since it took over its monetary reign from the 
Bundesbank is best described as a series of policy blunders that pushed inflation up and GDP 
growth down. The first blunder consisted of a clash between the ECB and financial markets, 
which resulted in a marked depreciation of the euro. The second featured the bank’s refusal to 
cut interest rates and boost growth, which resulted in a productivity slump that pushed up unit 
labor costs and core inflation. And the third blunder witnessed the ECB’s continued refusal to 
cut interest rates so as to stimulate a recovery, which saw fiscal policy, constrained by the 
Stability and Growth Pact, shifting into reverse gear, prompting increases in indirect taxes and 
administered prices; apart from further destabilizing the euro zone. This series of policy 
blunders pushed inflation up and left Euroland in a very fragile shape when the dollar’s 
depreciation prevented the world’s second largest economy from free-riding on external demand 
yet again.    
As to the euro’s plunge, the ECB’s role was one of acting as a two-fold propagation 
mechanism as the bank’s words and deeds provoked market opposition. I can be brief on the 
bank’s confusing words. Its first president was legendary for his gaffes. No less important was 
that Mr. Issing’s monotone “price stability above all else” anthem was way out of tune with the 
climate in financial markets at the time. The climate was one of growth enthusiasm, with 
                                                 
2 See Bibow 2004c for a more detailed analysis of the ECB’s record. 
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 inflation risks not seen as any serious threat. So when the ECB backed up its confusing words 
with all too clear actions, nearly doubling interest rates within less than a year, the markets 
simply took fright, preferring policymakers that were perceived as more growth friendly.  
  Interestingly, the risks and foreseeable consequences of euro-weakening interest rate 
hikes
3 were clearly spelled out by no other than the European Commission, vigilantly observing 
in its 2000 review of the EU economy: “To the extent that the depreciation in the euro is due to 
cyclical divergence between the euro area and the United States, a rise in interest rates in an 
attempt to support the currency could even backfire if it was perceived as stifling the euro-area 
recovery. The risk of creating an even more unbalanced growth pattern with weak domestic 
demand and higher export growth would be serious” (EC 2000: 71). Similarly, the BIS’s Annual 
Report (2001: 89) observed that: “On balance, market participants may have considered the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy stance to be excessively tight inasmuch as it may have negatively 
influenced the outlook for euro area growth.” Meanwhile the OECD (2001: 106) referred to a 
“countervailing impact of interest rates on exchange rates via growth expectations” and an 
“unpleasant monetary policy dilemma” (118). Notice that the ECB managed to push inflation up 
while choking domestic demand through its aggressive hikes, as Box 1 summarizes.
4  
                                                 
3 See Bibow (2001b, 2002) on the time-inconsistency hypothesis of the euro’s plunge.  
4 Note that I use interest rates here as shorthand for the whole transmission mechanism of monetary policy rather 
than the interest-rate channel alone. While some researchers seem to doubt the effectiveness of monetary policy, the 
ECB’s (2002) research on the transmission mechanism has revealed a strong impact of interest rates on domestic 
demand, primarily investment.   
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             Inflation above 2 percent then seemed to excuse the ECB’s subsequent refusal to cut 
rates as fast as it had hiked them, nicely illustrating the Bundesbank tradition of “quick to hike, 
slow to cut.” Between November 1999 and October 2000, the ECB hiked rates by 225 basis 
points, nearly doubling policy rates in less than a year. It then stood by as domestic demand, 
quite predictably, plunged after mid 2000. The ECB’s commentaries show that the bank was not 
just “out of touch” with financial markets, but also with developments in the economy.
5 As the 
euro’s plunge extended the export boom, domestic demand—seemingly unnoticed by the 
ECB—tanked (see figure 2).  
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5 For instance, in February 2001, as global growth was clearly slowing and the U.S. Federal Reserve had embarked 
on fast-track easing the month earlier, the ECB declared: “While this deceleration will have some dampening 
effects on euro area net exports, the euro area is a large economy in which economic developments are determined 
mainly by domestic factors. Overall, the fundamentals in the euro area remain broadly favourable” (ECB Monthly 
Bulletin February 2001: p. 5). Confirming this assessment in the March 2001 Bulletin, the ECB argued that “at this 
juncture, there are no signs that the slowdown in the U.S. economy is having significant and lasting spillover 
effects on the euro area” (p. 5).  
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              The trouble is that the ECB’s “wait and see” attitude (when it comes to easing) then 
provoked a severe productivity slowdown and a corresponding rise in unit-labor costs. Facing 
falling sales business was under pressure to keeping margins up. While the euro’s plunge 
pushed up headline inflation through magnifying the price effects of high oil prices and rising 
import prices more generally, blunder no. 2 saw to it that core inflation followed suit in 2001.  
Of course protracted stagnation and rising unemployment are bound to cause budgetary 
troubles. And this is where the ECB’s blunder no. 3 comes in. A sound monetary policymaker 
internalizes fiscal policy. Given Euroland’s fiscal regime, it was clear from the start that the 
ECB had to shoulder the bulk of the stabilization burden—or else face the consequences of a 
destabilized economy. The IMF’s head at the time, Horst Koehler, even reminded the ECB of 
this textbook wisdom, when he explained that monetary policy would be “the first line of 
defence.” Mr. Duisenberg responded that he had never heard of that (“Duisenberg defends 
holding rates steady.” Wall Street Journal Europe, 9 October 2002). 
As refusing to listen to outside advice is held a virtue at the ECB—and as an always 
welcome opportunity to “prove its independence” too—it should not be overlooked that it was 
the resulting protracted stagnation which has caused inflation to stay stubbornly above 2 percent 
ever since. A conspicuous gap has opened up since 2001 between headline inflation and what 
may be seen as market-determined (as opposed to government-determined) inflation. Rises in 
indirect taxes and administered prices, reflecting finance ministers’ desperate but vain attempts 
at keeping budget deficits below 3 percent, led to an upward distortion in headline inflation of 
around 0.5 percentage points by 2004. While, individually, such measures only give rise to one-
off price-level shifts, a continuous series of such measures can give rise to a continuous rise in 
general prices and significantly distort measured inflation. In fact, without “tax-push inflation” 
the ECB would not have failed on its price stability mandate in the last four years.  
12
 Figure 3. Déjà-vu all over again
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Source. ECB 2004, Weeber 1998, SVR
Notes: West-Germany: 1990 - 1994, core inflation measure by GCEE and Weeber (1998); 
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Figure 3 reminds us that the same phenomenon could be witnessed in Germany in the 
first half of the 1990s (Bibow 2005). At that time too, tax-push inflation was behind the 
conspicuous inflation persistence in a stagnating economy. Meanwhile, however, the disease has 
spread across Euroland. In addition, Figure 3 also shows a measure of core inflation (core2) that 
excludes energy, food, alcohol and tobacco, apart from administered prices. After its recession-
driven peak in 2002, underlying inflation in Euroland has declined sharply (reaching 1.2 percent 
by mid 2005); reflecting “historically low” wage inflation. No doubt this would make any 
properly cautious central bank’s deflation alert flash red.  
 
HOW THE MAASTRICHT REGIME HAS PLAYED OUT—SPREADING THE 
“GERMAN DISEASE” 
 
Box no. 2 summarizes the actual play-out of the Maastricht regime over recent years. At the 
heart of the current EMU crisis is a counterproductive interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policies, featuring tax-push inflation as the key symptom in a macroeconomic policy blunder 
that has left the euro area stranded in stagnation. Courtesy of the ECB, Euroland has become 
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 stuck in a stability-oriented vicious circle, with headline inflation persistently above the set limit 
of 2 percent due to tax-push inflation.
6 Notice how Euroland’s two key “stability-oriented” 
institutions, the SGP and the ECB, have thereby shot each other in the foot: as the ECB reneged 
on its growth mandate and failed to properly counter the symmetric shock of 2000-01, budget 
deficits of more and more member states began to pass through the 3 percent threshold by 2002; 
finance ministers’ desperate thrift campaigns, in turn, have then not only further destabilized 
Euroland, but kept inflation above the holy 2 percent threshold ever since, too.  
 
 
Much to its own surprise, Euroland is today finding out that emulating the Buba “success 
story” of asymmetric “management” of domestic demand, while fiscal policy is no longer 
allowed to take up the slack, actually means the opposite of the promised land of stability and 
growth. With the exception of Ireland, Greece, and Spain, domestic demand has plunged and 
seems set for subdued growth or protracted stagnation—the spreading of the “German disease.” 
Accordingly, by mid-2005, there are few countries left which are not struggling with the three 
percent limit of the SGP, excessive deficit procedures having been initiated against Germany, 
                                                 
6 I focus here on the short-run aspect of stagnation cum inflation persistence. While this vicious circle itself can 
easily cause hysteresis, as another popular measure, Euroland’s senseless thrift campaigns feature cuts in public 
investment, which cause even more clear-cut long-run damages.  
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 France, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. Public thrift for years to come is in the pipeline across 
Euroland. And according to the “German view,” but the German view only, this will continue to 
stimulate domestic demand growth.  
While this may seem to contradict popular excitement about President Bush’s 
“irresponsible” tax cuts since 2001, in truth, Germany’s as well as Euroland’s fiscal positions 
are already in a worse state than the U.S.’s; despiteor because ofthrift no matter what. 
Recall that the sustainability of public finances crucially hinges on GDP growth. As Figure 1 
above shows, in Germany’s case, public finances are on track for a continuous sharp rise in the 
debt ratio. In 2003, when Germany’s nominal GDP growth crumbled to barely 1 percent, the 
country’s (close to) four percent deficit ratio implied a steady state debt ratio of 400%! Even at 
slightly higher nominal GDP growth, courtesy of the rest of the world, Germany’s fiscal 
position remains in the doldrums; particularly as privatization revenues, which have helped to 
close many a hole en route so far, are set to dry up by next year.   
  In Euroland’s case too, nominal GDP growth has meanwhile fallen way below the 
implicit Maastricht norm of five percent. In 2005, the land of the euro will be lucky to achieve 
three percent. At a deficit ratio of close to three percent, Euroland is thus on course for a debt 
ratio of around 100%! By contrast, while the U.S. may have a higher deficit ratio of around 4 
percent, its debt ratio is rising only mildly—thanks to nominal GDP growth of around six 
percent. As Domar (1944) taught us more than half a century ago: growth is key to public debt 
sustainability. Europe’s taxpayers are paying a dear price for the ongoing fiscal folly indeed.   
  But the real trouble is that signs of learning from mistakes have yet to emerge from 
Frankfurt’s Eurotower, where confusion continues to reign as the ECB’s top officials never 
seem to tire of congratulating themselves. It is noteworthy that back in 2001 the world’s most 
independent central bank often excused its conspicuous refusal to cut interest rates by arguing 
that occurrences in the U.S. were of little importance, since “the euro area is a large economy in 
which economic developments are determined mainly by domestic factors” (ECB, February 
Monthly Bulletin, 2001, p. 5). After years of domestic demand stagnation Mr. Trichet appeared 
to look for help elsewhere when he referred to the following “normal sequence of events” in an 
interview: “Growth starts with exports, then passes on to investment and then to consumption. 
That is the normal sequence for Europe in this phase of the cycle” (Financial Times, 22 April 
2004).  
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 And for a while Euroland even seemed lucky enough to freeload yet again on external 
stimuli in the first half of 2004. Yet, this free ride was cut short by the euro’s sharp appreciation. 
Beware though in blaming the strong euro (or, external shocks) for Euroland’s troubles. In truth, 
Euroland’s GDP growth benefited significantly from net exports in the years 2000, 2001, and 
2002. Only in 2003 did net exports leave a dent in Euroland’s GDP growth. Over 2004 as a 
whole the strong euro then merely made sure that Euroland would be left behind the global 
growth train pulled along by the U.S. and China, and harvest what it had sown itself.
7 For 
Euroland’s problems are purely homemade: macroeconomic policy inflicted protracted domestic 
demand stagnation, the German disease, that is.  
  Once again exemplifying its peculiarly asymmetric driving style and habit for being out 
of touch with the economy, the ECB adopted what the markets perceived as a “tightening bias” 
in September 2004 (Financial Times Deutschland 8 September 2004). Just as the export boom 
was faltering and with domestic demand being as sluggish as ever, the ECB was getting ready to 
slam the brakes. This peculiar state of affairs continued until April 2005 (International Herald 
Tribune 5 April 2005). Barely back to a neutral stance the ECB was then not pleased when even 
the OECD (2005) advised that a 50 basis points cut would be appropriate in view of domestic 
demand stagnation.
8 
  The ECB’s position is based on its view that interest rates are “historically low” already 
and therefore cannot be a hindrance to growth—as the bank repeats ad nauseam. It is all too 
obvious that this view ignores Wicksell’s fundamental insight that the absolute level of the 
market rate of interest is not an adequate indicator of monetary stance. For what matters is its 
level relative to the equilibrium rate. To really boost growth in a situation of stagnation and 
unemployment the central bank has to push the market rate well below the level that would 
merely sustain the current situation. Deliberately kicking the accelerator down, however, is 
totally foreign to the ECB’s mindset. In the ECB’s view, “cautiously” releasing the brakes (after 
slamming them hard for whatever reason) is all it takes to move forward—as price stability 
causes growth (and if not structural problems are surely to blame).  
                                                 
7 While net exports’ contribution to GDP growth was zero in 2004 overall, the enormous export boom during the 
first half was probably key to the temporary acceleration of domestic demand at the time.  
8 The OECD made its position public at the press conference on the release of its Economic Outlook no. 77, in 
which the organization is free to offer its independent view. It is of some interest that the OECD’s explicit call for 
lower interest rates was not repeated in the annual survey on the euro area. This sparked some speculation that this 
owed to pressure from the ECB and European Commission, as those being assessed apparently have a say in what 
the verdict should be (FTD 14 July 2005). We probably have to conclude, then, that the independence of tax-payer-
funded central bank politicians has precedence over the independence of tax-payer-funded research.  
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   Curiously, in its efforts to resist outside pressures to ease policy the ECB even argues 
that doing so would undermine confidence and push bond yields up. Effectively, the ECB 
thereby admits that Euroland may already be in a “liquidity trap.” This is truly an embarrassing 
excuse though, since maneuvering the economy under its stewardship into a liquidity trap is 
generally seen as the ultimate blunder a central bank can possibly commit.  
Be that as it may, if it were really true that nominal interest rates cannot fall any further 
Euroland would have to place its hopes for lower real interest rates on rising inflation (while 
wage trends and the possibility of more euro strength, if anything, point in the opposite 
direction). A closer look at Germany’s situation today is in order here, the country that seems to 
suffer rather more than average under the Maastricht regime.  
 
WHY GERMANY SUFFERS MORE STILL  
 
A key premise and expectation of a German-style EMU was that by exporting Germany’s 
success model, this would work even better, both for Europe as well as for Germany itself. It is 
clearly not working for Euroland, and it was shown above that this failure owes primarily to the 
ECB’s reneging on its obligation to counter the symmetric shock to domestic demand that has 
left Euroland stranded in protracted stagnation. It also comes as no surprise that exporting the 
Buba “success story” has undermined its working at home. But why are things even far worse 
for Germany than for Euroland on average?  
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 Figure 4. Germany's competitive advantage turned on its head
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Even in Germany, some commentators have by now realized that Germany is today 
facing higher real interest rates than much of the rest of Euroland; when previously the country 
used to enjoy the (anchor currency) benefit of generally having the lowest. The German Council 
of Economic Experts too addressed this issue in its Annual Report of 2004/05. And, as Figure 4 
shows, there is no denying the fact that Germany’s traditional competitive advantage as to the 
relative levels of interest rates in Europe was turned on its head; by EMU, it seems.  
Some commentators are then quick to jump to the conclusion that the ECB’s excellent 
monetary policies are simply less good for Germany than the Bundesbank’s used to be. This 
view is missing the point on two counts. For one thing, the ECB’s policies were clearly too 
restrictive not just for Germany, but also for Euroland as a whole (just as the Bundesbank’s used 
to be inappropriate for EMS member countries as a group, one may add here). For another, if it 
really were just an incident of the “one-size-fits-all” problem, any excitement would be 
surprising as the issue was well understood ex ante. It was agreed that at any time a common 
monetary policy is generally more suitable for some regions than for others. Hence the general 
question was and remains how this diversity in monetary policy impact might best be 
compensated for, so that it does not lead to divergence.  
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 For the key fact is that the workings of the Maastricht regime together with Germany’s 
chosen response to its troubles have aggravated rather than alleviated those forces of 
divergence that were to be expected from the “one-size-fits-all” problem.  
To begin with, however, an important aspect in the turning on its head of Germany’s 
traditional monetary competitive advantage during the 1990s is that it actually originated from 
two sources. One was the convergence of nominal interest rates towards German levels that 
started in earnest in 1995. But no less important was another, which preceded it: the ERM crises 
of 1992-93, which saw a sharp appreciation of the DM against most European currencies; with 
Germany suffering a corresponding loss in competitiveness and slowdown in export growth. 
Arguably, this occurrence more than anything else prompted German “supply-side-only” 
instincts that the proper response to the situation was to restore its competitiveness eroded by 
these events by a strategy of wage underbidding (euphemistically called “wage restraint” 
(Lohnzurueckhaltung)).  
  In this regard, it is common today to refer to the sharp rise in Germany’s relative unit-
labor costs in the aftermath of unification. And it is popular to then justify the decline in 
Germany’s relative unit-labor costs since the mid 1990s as a reversal of this “shock.” A number 
of points are relevant here. First, referring to all-German data overlooks that much of the rise in 
unit labor costs over 1990-92 reflected developments in Eastern Germany and does not explain 
massive job losses in the West during the 1990s. Second, as far as Western Germany is 
concerned, much of the rise since 1992 was caused by the 1993 recession and protracted 
investment slump that ensued, depressing productivity growth accordingly. For neither workers 
nor unions are to blame when macroeconomic policies inflict such supply-side damages 
(repeated by the ECB for Euroland since 2001). In actual fact, wage inflation in the West 
exceeded the implicit Maastricht norm of five percent nominal GDP growth only briefly and 
mildly (peaking at 6 percent in 1991). This had occurred in the context of high productivity 
growth and after a prolonged period of “wage restraint” during the 1980s. Wage inflation 
quickly fell back to around 3 percent over 1993-95, and to “historically low” levels thereafter 
(zero by 2004).  
Third, as to the ERM crises of 1992-93, arguably, these—belatedly—merely 
compensated for the competitiveness gains Germany had accumulated during the “hard EMS” 
era through its strategy of “wage restraint,” delivering relatively lower inflation and sizeable 
DM depreciation in real terms over the course of the 1980s. Explanations of the ERM crises 
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 feature the fact that real exchange rates no longer reflected fundamentals. And recall that on the 
eve of unification West Germany had a current account surplus of 5 percent of GDP, much of 
which had its counterpart in corresponding deficits among its European trading partners.   
  Arguably, then, there was never any basis for the idea that Germany should set out to 
restore the competitiveness loss that occurred during the first half of the 1990s. In order to 
balance West Germany’s external position and prevent intra-European imbalances from 
escalating even further, the deutschmark had to appreciate markedly; as it did in 1992-93. 
Unification did not change this need for readjustment. Rather, for all-Germany a current account 
deficit for years or decades to come was to be expected simply reflecting a partial reliance on 
foreign resources in the rebuilding of the Eastern German economy. (Witness the external 
positions of the new EU members today.) Obviously, however, this is not at all what has 
happened. Instead, all-Germany is today experiencing soaring trade and current account 
surpluses. This implies that (hypothetical) West German surpluses have reached phenomenal 
dimensions, reflecting that (hypothetical) West Germany’s competitiveness is probably the envy 
of China and the rest of Europe, not to mention the U.S.!
9   
This has not helped Germany all that much though, and relatively high real interest rates 
are certainly part of that story. Since 1995 wage inflation across Euroland has succumbed to a 
2.5 percent trend—as a tribute to German “stability culture.” Hence “wage restraint” 1980s-
style does not work any more. So Germany goes for zero today! (And below zero tomorrow?) In 
addition, as the “German view” on expansionary fiscal contraction has become the norm and 
procyclical fiscal tightening is applied across Euroland today, Germany can no longer free ride 
on fiscal laxity elsewhere in Europe to compensate its own austerity either. Hence the German 
economics profession with its fine memories of the “successful” consolidation of the 1980s is at 
a loss. Alas, being at a loss does not seem to stop the country from administering itself ever 
more of the same medicine (Kromphardt 2003).  
It is the mixture of policies that lack any firm basis in theory or evidence together with 
certain adverse mechanisms that the EMU regime change has brought about, which are causing 
havoc in Germany’s economy. Above all, the “Instability and Stagnation Pact” (Bibow 2001a) 
has turned out as an amplifier of divergence. Recall: Given the “one-size-fits-all” problem, the 
issue was how to compensate those forces of divergence stemming from it. In actual fact, the 
                                                 
9 Suffice here to mention a peculiar debate on Germany’s supposed “bazaar economy,” (Sinn 2005) which deserves 
the very comment that Keynes spared on the so-called real balance effect: “really too fantastic for words and 
scarcely worth discussing.”  
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 “stupid” pact means that those in deepest trouble already will face not less but more fiscal 
austerity to augment their wreckage incurred.  
It is thus no surprise that the phenomenon of tax-push inflation is especially prominent 
in Germany’s case; and bound to gain new impetus with the schedule two-percentage-point rise 
in VAT in January 2006. A drastic decline in public investment is another. In recent years, 
Germany’s net public investment has turned even negative. Today the country quite literally lets 
its infrastructure rot! Given the notorious common place of “today’s deficits as tomorrow’s 
taxes” that dominates Germany’s economic policy debates and talk shows alike, it is ironic that 
Germany is proving that there is no better way to burden our children and grandchildren than to 
inflict senseless public thrift upon us. To describe this absurd situation I propose the following 
hypothesis: The more we refrain from spending on the right things (like infrastructure, 
education, research and development) in our desperate attempts at balancing the budget no 
matter what, the more we end up spending on the wrong things (i.e. unemployment)—without 
actually borrowing any less, or even more. In fact, by lastingly depressing GDP growth the debt 
burden is becoming heavier!  
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             To illustrate what is at issue for Euroland here, compare the cases of Germany and Spain 
(see Box 3). Just as Germany started as the “sick man of the euro” in 1999, thanks to the 
macroeconomic policies discussed further above, Spain experienced a domestic demand driven 
boom, courtesy of the interest rate convergence process. While Germany’s wage inflation has 
succumbed to its depressed economy and peculiar instincts, with income stagnation causing 
consumption stagnation, which is further aggravated as relatively high real interest rates depress 
asset prices and the ongoing fiscal squeeze crushes disposable incomes. Spain’s wage inflation 
holds up well, with income growth underpinning consumption and investment, which are further 
stimulated as relatively low real interest rates boost asset prices and the budgetary boon of high 
growth keeps the stupid pact at bay, or provides even room for tax cuts. Unsurprisingly, intra-
Euroland imbalances are soaring: as Germany’s external position improves, Spain’s 
deteriorates; somewhat alleviated by the fact that Spain is a recipient of EU funds while 
Germany is a net payer, itself another aspect of the absurdity of the whole situation.  
Beware: This comparative analysis is not meant to distract from the key fact that the 
German disease has meanwhile spread across much of Euroland (with Spain as a rare 
exception), reflecting the fact that the ECB’s policies were too restrictive not just for Germany, 
but for Euroland as a whole too. What the analysis shows is that it is the inherent workings of 
the Maastricht regime together with Germany’s chosen response to its troubles that are making 
the ECB’s policies even worse for Germany. In fact, fragility and divergence are getting worse 
across Euroland—thanks to the peculiar design of German-style EMU and Germany’s “stability 
culture.” And in all this, Germany is still leading the pack, its economy having been turned into 
a schizophrenic: export champion abroad, zombie economy at home. There are some important 
lessons for EMU here.  
 
A VICIOUS CIRCLE THAT HAS WRECKED GERMANY AND MAY SINK THE 
EURO TOO 
 
Watching the spreading of the “German disease” with amazement, the rest of the world sees a 
rudderless economic giant drifting along hoping for strong enough export currents to pull it 
along. Since its peak in March 2005, the euro has come back markedly against the U.S. dollar 
towards a level of 1.20. This easing of monetary conditions seems to relieve the ECB from 
cutting interest rates. Many observers currently place their bets, once again, on exports as 
Euroland’s rescue line and motor of growth. The rest of the world cannot be pleased about this 
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 sight, especially in view of soaring global imbalances. Nor can anyone who is really interested 
in the long-term survival of the euro project. For while external risks keep on growing along 
with global imbalances, recognizing the fact that Euroland’s troubles so far have been purely 
homemade is further postponed. 
  In fact, policy debates in Germany and Euroland remain trapped in the dogma of thrift 
and “stability,” which means stagnation and decline stay on the cards and the problems of 
fragility and divergence are set to get worse. Even international observers seem to have largely 
given up on any prospect for a belated use of macro stimulus, and place all their hopes on those 
easily invoked but rarely seen miracles that “structural reform” allegedly unleashes. No doubt 
Germany’s case offers clear evidence that structural reform combined with “anti-demand 
policies,” if anything, undermine confidence and weaken rather than boost growth though.  
Just as a prolonged fiscal tightening is in the pipeline across Euroland for years to come, 
pressures for “wage restraint” seem to be boiling over. The Netherlands is learning the hard way 
that a repeat of the “Dutch miracle” of the 1990s is hard to come by when German wage 
inflation is zero. But the view prevails that Italy—recently dubbed the “real sick man of the 
euro”—sinned in granting itself luscious wage inflation of around three percent for which it will 
have to endure chastisement in future years.  
Truly, wage inflation of three percent is anything but excessive. It corresponds to 
German-style “wage restraint” of the 1980s, and it is way below the implicit Maastricht norm of 
5 percent nominal GDP growth too. It is only made excessive by the wage-underbidding 
practices of others—the true sinners in this sad game of passing the buck. Essentially, EMU is 
being undermined today by exactly those policies that 50 years of European integration had 
anxiously tried to prevent: competitive devaluations.  
Yet, as Germany’s example has shown, wage deflation drives up real interest rates and 
triggers other destabilizing forces. If others followed suit, divergence within Euroland might 
diminish, but fragility would increase. Moreover, if the ECB is right that “historically low” 
nominal interest rates cannot fall further, across the board “wage restraint” will primarily tend to 
drive up real interest rates across Euroland. As Keynes taught us a long time ago: nominal 
wages controlled by social partners are the wrong instrument—the wage unit merely anchors the 
price level; if it does.  
What all this means is that euroization may still turn out as a rather brief chapter in 
Europe’s monetary history (which is often interpreted as a natural response to Germany’s 
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 unification). Beware though to blame the mess on the usual suspects—who were always lacking 
the right “stability culture,” as we (Germans) always knew. In Germany’s case, a sharp 
appreciation of a new deutschmark against, say, a new lira would merely wipe out the benefits 
of Germany’s beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the recent past, just as the ERM crises of 1992-
93 belatedly compensated for wage-driven divergences of the 1980s. Behind all this lies a 
thorough misapprehension of why the German model worked in the past, for Germany, that is. 
The model cannot work for Euroland as a whole—no matter how deafening the structural waffle 
might still get.   
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